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a 
The Multinational as a Corporate Form: A Critical 
Contribution from Organization Studies 
Glenn Morgan 
Introduction 
In the study of international business as a specific field within management, 
multinationals are conceptualized as rational economic actors taking decisions about 
locational strategies on the basis of issues of efficiency and profitability (Rugman, 
2009). In the process, they diffuse capital, technology, knowledge and skills across the 
world. These investments are perceived to have positive spill-over and learning effects 
which help draw locations into the global economy and gradually shift populations out 
of poverty. This perspective supports in general the principle of free trade, the removal 
of barriers to free trade and the development of a global structure that reinforces free 
trade through the World Trade Organization and associated inter-governmental 
treaties. It supports the rights of multinational corporation (MNC) management to 
decide on firm strategy and assumes that these decisions will lead in the end to a 
trickle-down effect of economic and social benefits. It dismisses the actions of 
employees and governments to resist and reshape these policies as ineffective and 
counter-productive. 
Critical management studies of the MNC have challenged this view from a variety 
of perspectives (see the discussion of the different perspectives in Collinson and 
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Morgan, 2009). It is not unusual for critiques to simply reverse the mirror – in other 
words to argue that MNCs are primarily about senior management decisions but 
contrary to the proponents of globalization’s benefits the consequences of this process 
are negative – the exploitation of employees and environments, the extraction of value 
into the hands of financial capital. In this chapter, the aim is to suggest something 
different from both these perspectives by emphasizing that the multinational as an 
organization is the site of ongoing struggles between, on the one hand, actors in the 
MNC headquarters who control access to key financial resources and local actors in 
subsidiaries who exercise power over the process of production of goods and services 
for markets. The chapter explores this struggle which is embedded in the degree to 
which actors inside MNC subsidiaries are able to strategize on their own account 
against the demands of the MNC HQ. Is it possible for subsidiaries to resist and what are 
the consequences of this resistance? Thus the aim here is to open up the black box of the 
‘multinational’ which is kept closed both by economists’ insistence on perceiving the 
firm as a unitary rational actor and by the opposite tendency of perceiving the firm as 
an instrument of globalization and exploitation. Instead, the MNC here is presented as a 
transnational social space characterized by mechanisms of hierarchy and domination 
but also defined by the ongoing efforts of different social groups to contest that 
hierarchy. 
The chapter proceeds in the following sections. Firstly, it describes how the 
concept of the multinational has moved in management and organization studies from 
one that simply assumed a hierarchical set of relations with subsidiaries as mere 
enactments of the HQ towards a view of subsidiary ‘activism’. Secondly, it explores in 
more depth the social, economic and institutional basis of subsidiary activism; it 
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identifies a variety of underlying conditions which facilitate or inhibit forms of 
subsidiary activism. What matters is the degree to which actors in local contexts can 
create collective capabilities and powers that enable them to strategize to achieve such 
benefits. Clearly, in a highly financialized form of capitalism, this is difficult to achieve. 
Most contexts are likely to reveal more limited spill-overs that are distributed unequally 
and therefore contribute. 
Strategy and Structure in Multinationals 
The international business literature on multinationals as expressed in textbooks in 
international business perceives the management and organizational issues involved 
from a highly centralized perspective (e.g. the contributions in Rugman, 2009). It 
assumes that power and authority reside in the headquarters and therefore key 
decisions about strategy and structure will be made there and will be passed down into 
and implemented by the subsidiary and branches of the firm. However, it is also 
cognizant of the problem of knowledge and information asymmetry. The headquarters 
may be all powerful but they are not all knowing. It cannot know the details of 
particular markets, in terms of consumer tastes, regulations, work conditions etc. This 
knowledge may be held more clearly in subsidiaries and branches and the resulting 
information asymmetry creates a dilemma for the MNC which is reflected in its strategy 
and structure. On the one hand, one of the key advantages of the MNC is scale. Because it 
is producing for a number of markets, it can build larger units for the production of 
goods and services and achieve higher economies of scale. The more a firm can 
standardize its products and services and materialize them in large plants or offices, the 
more competitive it becomes. This argues for a ‘global’ decision-making process 
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whereby the firm decides the best location for the production of its goods and services, 
and exports from this base to all its main markets. In this model, the MNC assumes that 
variation across localities is limited or irrelevant. It does not need ‘local knowledge’; it 
can use the knowledge it has developed in its home base about how to organize 
production and sell products and services to do so on a global scale. On the other hand, 
national markets are often subject to different expectations from retailers, consumers 
and industrial markets as well as consumer tastes and different regulations, thus 
making global standardization difficult. Furthermore, states may set import taxes at 
levels that equalize the price of products from outside its boundaries and in this way 
support and sustain employment internally. These two tendencies have been analysed 
in terms of the dynamic between integration (the global imperative) and 
responsiveness (adaptation to consumer tastes, particular regulatory patterns, 
networks relationships in local markets) (Doz and Prahalad, 1984). 
the key implication which arises from this for orthodox international business 
research is that MNC headquarters and subsidiaries have different roles and 
relationships depending on the strategic purposes defined by the MNC. This is an 
important development because it shows that not all subsidiaries are the same – it is 
necessary to consider their distinctiveness in order to understand how far they embed 
into the local community, diffusing skills, technologies and learning outside the 
boundaries of the subsidiary. Or are they on the contrary primarily isolated and alien 
units in the locality without any sorts of roots or positive spill-overs? 
In a highly influential framework, Bartlett and Ghoshal identified four models of 
organization that responded to different emphases between standardization and 
responsiveness (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002): 
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Begin Table 2a.1 
Table 2a.1 
Bartlett and Ghoshal’s model adapted 
 Low Global Integration High Global Integration 
Low local responsiveness International Global 
 Skills and knowledge in 
headquarters transferred to 
subsidiaries in local markets 
Highly efficient: production 
organized on a global scale 
to maximize economies of 
scale in standardized 
products 
High local responsiveness Multinational Transnational 
 Main focus on the national 
markets; little integration of 
production, management 
skills or knowledge across 
national contexts 
Production planned to 
maximize economies of scale 
but local contexts remain 
central, so that products are 
adapted to local contexts 
and learning is transferred 
across subsidiaries 
End Table 2a.1 
From this perspective, it is clear that the different types of firms presented by 
Bartlett and Ghoshal imply different types of vulnerability and strength in subsidiaries. 
An important element in this is the nature and scale of the investment which the MNC 
has made in the local subsidiary. The larger the investment, the stickier it is and the less 
likely that the MNC will exit, particularly where this involves ‘greenfield’ investment – 
that is, where new capital has been used to establish a new subsidiary. By contrast 
‘brownfield’ investment refers to investment which is the outcome of a merger or 
acquisition thus bringing no new investment into productive facilities. 
Subsidiary Strategy: From Voice to Politics 
In Bartlett and Ghoshal, the dynamic actor is the MNC HQ which sets the framework 
within which subsidiaries are embedded. However, this was clearly to understate the 
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degree to which subsidiaries could strategize to respond to the HQ and to their 
vulnerabilities. Within the orthodox literature on MNCs, this has been explored in terms 
of how subsidiaries strategize across a number of fronts (Birkinshaw, 1996; see 
especially the work of Julian Birkinshaw: Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw, 
2000; Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005). One is to make themselves more valuable to the 
MNC by gaining mandates that make them key to the overall mission of the MNC, for 
example, by holding a central place in the development of a certain technology, process 
or product. This requires that they compete against other subsidiaries in internal 
market processes when new investments are being considered. Another strategy is to 
make themselves visible to the HQ by ensuring that their role in the MNC is fully 
appreciated; they look for a ‘voice’ in wider strategic debates and innovations in the 
MNC (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; 2011). 
Orthodox business school analysis of multinationals has therefore recognized the 
need to incorporate a perspective from subsidiaries into its analysis. Subsidiaries in this 
view can take strategic action to alter their position within the multinational in terms of 
its significance for the MNC. A subsidiary can develop its position as a source of 
specialist knowledge or highly efficient production that makes it essential to the HQ and 
to the operation of other subsidiaries. It can also develop the perception of its value to 
the MNC by engaging in various activities to promote itself. In this way, the MNC 
continues to invest into the local subsidiary. Where subsidiaries fail to do either of these 
things they make themselves more vulnerable to either closure or rationalization or 
spin-off. Thus we can understand processes of investment, divestment, closure and 
growth inside the MNC as responses to the interaction between, on the one hand, the 
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demands of the MNC HQ and the strategies which it sets for subsidiaries and, on the 
other hand, the responses of those subsidiaries to these demands. 
Recent research, however, has not been satisfied with this formulation of the 
processes described. There are a number of critical points which can be made. Firstly, 
the categories of HQ and subsidiary are treated unproblematically and without any 
analysis of the heterogeneity of the social actors that constitute these categories. 
Secondly, and associated with this, there is an assumption that the assets and resources 
which the actors utilize inside the MNC are essentially derived from the MNC itself. In 
other words little attention is paid to the external institutional setting of the MNC and 
its subsidiaries. Only by putting the MNC and its actors back into this institutional 
setting is it possible to make sense of the powers and capabilities which different actors 
bring to conflicts over investments, mandates, concession bargaining etc. From this 
perspective, the degree to which a subsidiary and locality continue to receive 
investment from the MNC is not the happy by-product of rational economic decision-
making but the result of intense political struggle between different actors drawing on 
unequal resources in a competitive and uncertain market environment. 
In relation to the first point about the interests and actors which constitute HQ 
and subsidiaries, it is necessary to note that the constitution of these two arenas are 
inter-dependent as well as separate. They are firstly interdependent because 
characteristically MNC HQ send senior managers to run subsidiaries. This makes it 
difficult to define a simplistic difference of interest between the HQ and the subsidiary. 
There are a variety of models of this process at work. Japanese multinationals, for 
example, tend to send Japanese nationals to their subsidiary and these take the key 
positions in terms of strategy and production. Host country nationals are generally 
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employed to manage HRM and marketing and sales strategies. The ruling elite of the 
Japanese MNC stays Japanese and its overseas managers constitute the eyes and ears of 
the company in the host country (Whitley et al, 2003). US and UK multinationals on the 
other hand have increasingly developed the model of an international management 
cadre which is heavily socialized into the HQ view of the world (since it makes its 
careers by moving around and up the various subsidiary structures in the hope of 
eventually reaching a senior position in the head office). This international management 
cadre is increasingly made up of a range of nationalities which share a standard pre-
socialization in international business schools, consulting firms, accountancies etc 
(Almond and Ferner, 2006). Thus, it is necessary to go deeper into the subsidiary to 
understand how interests and strategies are formulated there. Where there is a strong 
and powerful tier of managers either from head office (as in the Japanese case) or from 
the international management cadre (as in the US/UK case), then it is likely that this 
will influence the strategies pursued by the subsidiary. Such subsidiaries are likely to 
play the game which the HQ dictates – this may mean competing for new investment 
and for possible growth but it may equally well be about closure and reduction. In this 
perspective, local spill-overs and learning effects are predominantly dictated by head 
office requirements, a situation which leaves local actors relatively powerless. In other 
contexts, however, the dominant managerial group in the subsidiary may be locals who 
perceive a community of fate with other employees in the firm and are therefore willing 
and able to strategize for the development of the subsidiary, either within or 
exceptionally outside the current MNC (as discussed in Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005) 
However, the literature from organization studies suggests that this perspective 
has to be balanced by a focus on other social actors within the local context (Bélanger et 
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al, 1999; Morgan et al, 2001; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006; Kristensen and Morgan, 
2007; Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2009; Becker-Ritterspach and Dörrenbächer, 2011; 
Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011; Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2011). Considering, 
firstly, the actors internal to the subsidiary – what strengths and capabilities might they 
have which could counteract or develop alternatives to the strategies which the MNC 
HQ seeks to impose? There are a number of elements to the answer to this question – 
the degree of internal solidarity within the workforce, the degree to which this is 
institutionalized in specific practices and procedures, the degree to which this is linked 
to distinct capabilities, the degree to which this is reinforced and legitimated in the 
external environment and finally the degree to which exit is a sensible option for actors 
in the subsidiary. These issues are in turn related to the nature of the external 
environment in two respects; firstly, the range of alternatives for the collective 
capabilities of the subsidiary outside of its location in the MNC and, secondly, the degree 
to which actors in the local environment are able to support the actors inside the 
subsidiary or are themselves captured by the discourse of the MNC HQ. 
Degree of Internal Solidarity: this refers to the degree of shared commitment amongst 
the workforce in the subsidiary. The weaker this solidarity the easier it is for the MNC 
HQ to impose its own policies on the subsidiary. This has already been partially 
discussed in relation to the question of subsidiary senior management; where these are 
predominantly drawn from the home base or from a cadre of identified international 
managers, then this group is more likely to conform strongly to HQ policy. This is not an 
inevitable aspect of MNC subsidiaries; it partially depends on whether the subsidiary is 
a greenfield/new build operation (in which case MNC HO involvement in management 
is likely to be high) or if it is an existing entity acquired from previous owners (which in 
  10 
turn may be another MNC or a variety of other others such as private equity, family firm, 
MBO etc). Internal solidarity is also affected by the nature of the labour force, including 
its skill, gender and ethnic composition, its degree of turnover, the variability of 
employment contracts etc. Kristensen and Zeitlin show that where the workforce has 
long-term shared relationships in the subsidiary, this makes it more possible to 
articulate different interests from internal management and from the MNC HQ 
(Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005) 
Degree of Institutionalization of Internal Solidarity: this characteristic puts the 
emphasis on the significance of trade union and other forms of employee representation 
in the workplace. Where trade unions are recognized and have the capacities to develop 
their own perspectives, then this provides a possible base for the development of 
collective interests, particularly when there are institutionalized forms of 
representation, eg in works councils or in other forms of bargaining (Hansen-Miller, this 
volume). Trade unions frequently challenge MNC decisions over closure or 
restructuring, using expert advice and their members to articulate alternative 
approaches to those presented by management (Ferner, 1997). Where as in the 
European Union, cross-national works councils are legitimate and possible, this 
facilitates a process of negotiation between employees on different subsidiaries and has 
effects on identity and solidarity more widely even if these remain relatively limited in 
terms of constraining multinational management (Marginson et al, 2004; Greer and 
Hauptmeier, 2012; Keune and Marginson, 2013). 
The Role of Distinct Skills and Capabilities: where employees are highly skilled in 
particular production processes and have knowledge of these which is often more 
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accurate than that of MNC HQ which rely on accounting and management information 
systems to provide their understanding, then local employees have a stronger potential 
for building alternative strategic plans for a subsidiary than in cases where the 
workforce is essentially unskilled or semi-skilled working in a highly Fordist system of 
production. 
The Degree to Which Specific Skills and Capabilities in the Subsidiary Are More 
Widely Recognized and Legitimated: where other subsidiaries in the MNC are reliant 
on the specific skills and contributions of a particular subsidiary, this reinforces its 
solidarity. This can be linked to networks of specialists inside MNCs where transfers of 
knowledge, equipment and processes lead to the recognition of specialist expertise. This 
also relates to the external environment; the more actors in the external environment 
recognize and legitimate the special skills of employees in the subsidiary, the more they 
are likely to offer support to them, by providing training and other facilities to maintain 
that leading edge. This may also lead local actors to accede to demands from the MNC 
HQ for more support for the subsidiary as a whole eg tax breaks, grants, infrastructure 
improvements (Marginson and Meardi, 2010). 
Exit Possibilities for Employees: where exit possibilities are limited, then local 
employees share a common fate. This creates a defensive form of solidarity and 
commitment to the survival of the subsidiary which may involve concession bargaining 
through management whipsawing tactics. Where exit possibilities for individual 
employees are high, usually related to there being something like a cluster of companies 
working in the same area and competing for valuable high quality labour, then it is the 
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MNC HQ which has to find ways to keep people in the subsidiary by increasing rewards 
and opportunities. 
Exit Possibilities for the Subsidiary Itself; the current system of financialized 
capitalism is one in which there is frequent trading of and restructuring of the assets of 
firms. This takes many different forms and these forms expanded in scope and 
significance in the period up to the 2008 financial crash. When an MNC engages in 
restructuring, its worst option will be closure in terms of the loss it takes though 
quickest and in some circumstances, simplest. Other ‘sell’ options are more preferable. 
On the sell side, MNCs under pressure to reduce costs and restructure continually 
evaluate the contribution of their different subsidiaries and businesses. This can lead to 
the sell-off of product divisions, of geographical divisions or at the level of a business 
division, the sale of certain subsidiaries and units in order to exit a particular declining 
market or to concentrate activities in larger units. On the buy side, there are a variety of 
potential buyers, ranging from MNCs with strategies to concentrate, consolidate or 
expand into new markets by making such purchases; there are private equity firms 
borrowing and using investors’ funds in order to buy businesses which can be 
aggressively restructured to make a profit; there are management teams willing to 
engage in buy-outs (MBOs) to separate themselves from the heavy overhead costs of 
MNCs. Some of these buyers, most particularly private equity and MBOs, also have a 
strategy of turning into a seller somewhere down the line in the short to medium term. 
The point here is that subsidiaries may have futures outside that of their current 
position within a particular MNC (see, for example, the discussion of MNCs and their 
subsidiaries in Finland in Kristensen and Lilja, 2011, which shows these shifts in 
ownership occurring whilst the productive unit remains). The question, however, is 
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whether that future is one decided in financial markets and in the MNC HQ or whether 
the subsidiary itself has sufficient solidarity, power and influence to impact on future 
ownership. This relates to the final issue. 
The Degree to Which Actors in the Local Environment Are Able to Support the Actors 
inside the Subsidiary or Are Themselves Captured by the Discourse of the MNC HQ: 
in some contexts, local actors in the external environment look at the subsidiary entirely 
through the lens of the HQ. They assume and accept the economic rationality of 
decisions flowing from the HQ and do not challenge them. In some societies this reflects 
issues of corruption and control, ie MNCs capture local officials and these officials act as 
brokers for them with other institutions such and regulators or tax authorities in order 
to maximize the MNC advantage. The legitimating ideology is that the MNC brings 
employment and therefore the idea that local actors inside the subsidiary or in the 
immediate environment would have any grounds for challenging the HQ would be 
dismissed. In relatively transparent systems without so much overt corruption, there 
would be more of a tension between accepting the MNC HQ decision and listening to 
local actors. Where the local actors inside the firm are strongly linked to institutions 
outside the firm, ie to the local government, to trade union collective organizations, to 
networks of other firms and education, training and financing institutions, then there is 
more chance of alliances bringing together internal and external groups to challenge HQ 
policy (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2011; Kristensen and Lilja, 2011; see eg the cases 
discussed in Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005). However, the degree to which this can be 
effective will be further affected by the nature of policy at the national governmental 
level (Almond, 2011). Where this is predominantly a neoliberal approval of 
globalization as directed by MNC HQs, then local resistance will find it difficult to 
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survive but if there are national forces that can support ‘local’ struggles, the impact will 
be more complex, eg in France. 
Conclusions 
This paper has argued that a proper appreciation of the multinational corporation must 
go beyond economists’ models of rationality and efficiency and simple models of the 
positive effects of globalization. However, it also needs to go beyond fatalistic views that 
local actors are powerless to resist the decisions of MNCs. Clearly, the predominant 
weight of power and influence goes to those who can accumulate the largest financial 
resources and have the ability to shift them quickly both across geographical space and 
also between different types of assets. The history of modern capitalism has been a 
history of the struggle between owners and employees over limitations to the power of 
money and markets. As money and markets have extended, new pools of labour have 
become incorporated without the benefit of the forms of protection established in 
developed economies over decades of such struggle. MNCs have found it relatively easy 
to place into these locations subsidiaries that make use of low levels of workforce 
solidarity, low levels of institutionalized collectivism, low skills etc. This has enabled 
MNCs to increase their profitability by shifting employment to cheaper areas and 
subjecting employees in developed areas to concession bargaining. 
However, there are countervailing powers that can be exercised on the MNC if 
the workforce in the subsidiary is sufficiently solidary and is supported by internal and 
external institutions. Extending existing mandates within the MNC derives from the 
ability of the employees to develop special competences that are valuable to others 
inside the firm or connected to it through production chains. Such competences often 
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rely on the existence of local labour markets, local training institutions and local welfare 
systems that provide individuals with the opportunities to learn and develop skills that 
can be put to use in creating these high levels of expertise. The subsidiary which is 
created in this way evolves a reputation – in its local context, amongst its customers and 
amongst other parts of the MNC – that gives it a distinct identity which can in theory at 
least carry on through changes in ownership. Thus local actors here have the possibility 
of building and surviving through different forms of ownership in a competitive and 
financialized capitalism because they are capable – in their own right – of producing 
something that is valuable and valued. 
These are the two extremes of MNC subsidiaries. On the one hand, and by far the 
more numerous, are the subsidiaries which are dependent on the MNC HQ, have very 
little solidarity of their own, very little existence of their own. These are vulnerable to 
the MNC switching assets and there is very little that can be done other than a 
continuous race to the bottom. At the other end, far less in number but nevertheless 
important, are those subsidiaries that are strongly embedded in local institutions and in 
networks of customers and suppliers which go beyond the MNC. Their existence whilst 
still precarious given the nature of financialized capitalism has more stability so long as 
they are capable of sustaining their distinctive competences. This may not always be 
possible because of the control and coercion which the MNC HQ exercises but in a 
context where there are supportive external institutions and internal actors sustain 
their solidarity, the possibility exists that such subsidiaries can survive the waves of 
restructuring and ownership change which characterize contemporary capitalism. 
Many subsidiaries lie between these two extremes. MNCs cannot always 
liquidate or sell on large assets, particularly where these have been greenfield sites. Nor 
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can they risk falling foul of governments in large markets by closing down operations 
due to corporate restructuring driven by cost-cutting logics. On the other hand, 
employees may not see any alternative to the current system of MNC ownership and 
may engage in concession bargaining, driven to protect what they have rather than 
strategize about developing new products and services that could enable the locality to 
become stronger, the networks deeper and the future more autonomous. 
In conclusion, the multinational corporation is necessarily a hierarchical space 
dominated by financial interests in the headquarters but the internal space itself is 
much diverse and subject to conflict and struggle. Furthermore the boundaries of the 
internal space are permeable; the connections (or lack of them) between internal actors 
and external actors and institutions is crucial to understanding how this hierarchical 
transnational space is subverted, challenged and reconstructed. This permeability is 
also reflected in the ease with which subsidiaries as assets can be transferred between 
different financial entities. A critical theory of the corporation therefore needs to take 
account of this transnational social space, its internal diversity and boundary 
permeability in order to understand the dynamics of MNCs and their effects on local 
economies (Morgan, 2001). This points to the way in which such accounts of 
multinationals can engage on a policy level where issues arise about MNCs closing or 
divesting from local areas as well as the importance of providing a framework for FDI 
that maximizes the embeddedness of the subsidiary in to the local institutional context 
whilst still ensuring that it has connections to global markets, either internally through 
the MNC or externally through sales to other MNCs or to direct to customers. In recent 
years the USA has sought to reduce the possibilities of states and other local actors 
constraining the rights of MNCs to enter and leave sites; The Transatlantic Trade and 
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Investment Partnership Treaty which is being discussed between the EU and the USA 
introduces the Investor–State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) which allows companies to 
sue governments if those governments’ policies cause a loss of profits. Thus MNCs can 
shift the terrain of power by influencing how international treaties create obligations 
and responsibilities for different actors. 
Overall, the MNC may seem like an unaccountable Leviathan but it is constituted 
by diverse actors with different sets of interests. Whilst power is unequally distributed 
in the MNC, it is possible to oppose fatalism in the face of MNC decisions and instead 
aim to build alliances that can harness the positive elements of the MNC, such as the 
transfer of technology, capital and knowledge as well as the access to global markets, to 
the benefit of local communities. 
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